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Free Speech and the “Unique Evils” of Public
Accommodations Discrimination
Elizabeth Sepper†

INTRODUCTION
For over a hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court—and an array
of state supreme courts—consistently rejected arguments that businesses open to the public have a constitutional right to provide less than
the full and equal services required by antidiscrimination laws.1 The
Supreme Court made clear that public accommodations law “does not,
on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content.”2
First Amendment claims involving unusual applications of public accommodations law have sometimes met success.3 But the Court drew a
sharp contrast between expressive associations—safeguarded from application of the law—and “commercial relationship[s] offered generally
or widely”—entitled to no First Amendment protection.4 First

† Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. I’m grateful to Kathryn
Garza for excellent research assistance and to the participants in the University of Chicago Law
School’s Legal Forum Symposium, What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, for
their comments and suggestions. I thank Nika Arzoumanian, Rebecca Boorstein, Austin Kissinger, Daniel Simon, Anna Porter, James Gao, Rebecca Roman, Claire Lee, Qi Xie, and the rest of
the journal staff for their superb organizing and editorial assistance.
1
E.g., W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 364 (1907); Messenger v. State, 41 N.W.
638, 639 (Neb. 1889); People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 248–49 (N.Y. 1888).
2
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (observing that public accommodations laws “do not, as a general matter, violate the First
or Fourteenth Amendments”).
3
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 (“In the case before us, however, the Massachusetts law has been
applied in a peculiar way.”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000) (distinguishing entities like “taverns, restaurants, [and] retail shops” from non-commercial membership
organizations like the Boy Scouts that “may not carry with them open invitations to the public”).
4
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Hurley, 515 U.S. at
571; Dale, 530 U.S. at 657 (distinguishing entities like “taverns, restaurants, [and] retail shops”
from organizations that “may not carry with them open invitations to the public” or are not “clearly
commercial entities”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(observing constitutional “dichotomy” between the rights of expressive and commercial organizations).

273

274

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

Amendment claims from businesses failed, regardless of whether they
were framed as rights of free speech, free association, or free exercise.5
But over the last decade, a movement for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws has taken hold.6 For-profit businesses refuse to take
photos or videos, bake cakes, print invitations, rent accommodations, or
arrange flowers for same-sex couples out of religion-based objections to
same-sex relationships. While religion motivates business owners, public accommodations laws easily meet the Free Exercise Clause’s requirements of neutrality and general applicability.7 These laws were
adopted to eradicate discrimination, not target religion, and are generally applicable, usually applying to every place open to the public.8 As
a result, the question at the heart of these cases is whether cake baking,
flower arranging, wedding hosting, or invitation lettering is speech. Objectors argue that requiring businesses to sell goods and services on
equal terms to a same-sex couple compels them to speak in favor of the
marriage.
Court after court rejected these arguments.9 But then, in 2019, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Arizona Supreme Court
became the first courts to hold that wedding businesses have a free
speech (and free exercise) right to refuse service.10 Two justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Thomas and Gorsuch, have indicated their agreement.11 In the near future, the Court will likely take up the issue. So—
as this symposium asks—what’s the harm?
Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court instructed that “unique
evils” inhered in discrimination in public commerce.12 In this essay, I

5

See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973) (noting that no court has ever granted “affirmative
constitutional protections” to private discrimination).
6
Sarah Posner, The Christian Legal Army Behind Masterpiece Cakeshop, NATION (Nov. 28,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiece-cakeshop/
[perma.cc/R7FH-RA5L].
7
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not offend the Free Exercise Clause).
8
See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638–62 (2016) (describing the scope and limited exceptions from these laws).
9
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 68 (N.M. 2013); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137
A.D.3d 30, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo.
App. 2015); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 438–39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
(“The items [calligraphers] would produce for a same-sex or opposite-sex wedding would likely be
indistinguishable to the public.”), rev’d, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2019); State v. Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1225 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 12, 2019); Klein v.
Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
10
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d
at 895.
11
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgement).
12
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).

273]

EVILS OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DISCRIMINATION

275

evaluate what might be unique about public accommodations within
the civil rights framework. As Part I describes, by inviting the general
public, public accommodations generate expectations of service, expectations always realized by the in-group—often defined by race, religion,
and gender—and sometimes denied to minorities. Unlike employment,
housing, and other spheres of antidiscrimination, public accommodations operate according to accepted conventions of nonselectivity. The
public expects businesses to deliver goods and services on a first-come,
first-served basis, to charge the same prices, and to treat people with
respect for their status as consumers.
As Part II argues, the status of consumer entitles would-be patrons
to a modicum of respect for their dignity. By contrast to discrimination
in employment and housing, discrimination in consumer goods imposes
trivial monetary damages on any particular individual, even as it has
large aggregate effects in the market. But, as the law governing public
accommodations has understood, public-facing businesses have particular power to inflict damage to one’s status as a consumer and citizen.
Under the common law, courts recognized dignitary damages in order
to enforce businesses’ obligations to the public. Given the absence of
significant money damages for failing to honor a movie ticket or sell a
hamburger, dignitary damages provided an otherwise missing deterrent effect. They ensured marginalized groups would no longer have to
participate in the performance of their own inferiority before the audience inherent to businesses that welcome the public.
The final two Parts sketch the import of the unique evils of public
accommodation discrimination for free speech. Part III argues that this
arena manifests unified conventions of the consumer marketplace. The
law of public accommodations shapes a consumer capitalist market that
operates with an ideal of neutrality toward identity traits and aspires
to frictionless transactions and movement. The result is a consumer
marketplace where people and money flow freely in low-information,
low-stakes transactions.
Part IV indicates an overlooked asymmetry in the communicative
potential of service and denial. Because of social expectations of service,
a business communicates little, if anything, when it provides a good or
service to any particular customer. The wedding vendor signals no approval of the person or the use of the goods by its service. By contrast,
denial of service powerfully expresses that a person (or group) does not
merit status as a consumer. The message conveyed by breaking uniform
conventions of service does not depend on the artistic or bespoke nature
of the product sold or the celebration of any particular event. Free
speech claims built around denial of service cannot be so cabined.
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CONSUMER STATUS AND THE EXPECTATION OF SERVICE

Most spheres of life governed by civil rights laws—whether employment, housing, or credit—manifest selectivity. Consider employment,
the focus of most antidiscrimination scholarship. Employers use discretion and often subjective criteria in choosing among applicants. They
gather ample information, ranging from resumes and references to personality tests and credit checks. People find themselves denied jobs for
an array of legitimate reasons—a lack of experience, bad interview, improper fit, or preference for alumni of the boss’s alma mater.
Our expectations of employment are rejection and disappointment
or, at best, uncertainty about the direction of decision making. Applicants neither anticipate nor receive any response from many jobs to
which they apply. Employers routinely reject applicants, deny promotions, and turn down requests for raises.
By contrast, public-facing businesses—from restaurants to grocery
stores, from ballparks to theaters, from flower shops to bakeries—welcome all comers. People rarely offer their names, let alone personal details, in these places. The business tends to inquire only as to the
method of payment. Customers rarely anticipate or receive rejection
without good reason that the tables are booked or the tickets sold out.
Even rejection often serves as invitation to reserve for a future date or
to return for a later game.
Unlike employers, public accommodations do not have an interest
in, or practice of, choosiness.13 The business is organized around abstract customers—any member of the public is welcomed to deal.14 This
invitation generates expectations of service, expectations consistently
realized by the in-group—whether white, male, or heterosexual—and
sometimes denied to minorities. Over the twentieth century, the enactment and enforcement of public accommodations law secured consumer
status for increasing numbers of people. Today, proprietors and consumers alike assume a convention of equal access.
These expectations derive from a long history of business duties to
consumers. Even before the first public accommodations statute was
13

See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term Foreword: “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 102 (1967) (“It is not a warranted
assumption of our civilization that a lunch-counter proprietor will practice a general choosiness
about his customers, or that the law is expected to leave him alone in this regard.”); James M.
Oleske, “State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 50 (2016) (“[T]he law did not assume bakers, florists, and caterers had such an interest
in being selective about their customers before same-sex couples requested equal service.”).
14
Amnon Reichman, Professional Status and the Freedom to Contract: Towards a Common
Law Duty of Non-Discrimination, 14 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 79, 108 (2001) (“The profession is
organized around an interaction with an abstract customer, any member of the public, and hence
is organized around serving the public. Consequently, equal access to the services provided by the
business as such is intrinsic to the profession.”).
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passed, the common law required equal access to businesses open to the
public. As Joseph Singer has demonstrated, prior to the Civil War the
common law rule dictated that “[t]hose who hold themselves out as
ready to serve the public thereby make themselves public servants and
have a duty to serve.”15 The rule appears to have applied broadly, to
barber shops, victuallers, bakers, tailors, and traders.16 Having invited
consumers in, a business could not exclude any one of them without
good cause.
Under the common law, the status as a consumer was closely linked
to citizenship. Thus, after the Civil War, it briefly seemed that newly
freed slaves would gain full and equal access to public businesses under
the common law.17 The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, observed that the common law had “always” demanded that inns, common
carriers, and “public shows and amusements” be open to all “unless sufficient reason were shown.”18 During Reconstruction, state supreme
courts often concluded that that even in the absence of a statute, black
people were due equal treatment.19 And when the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the federal Civil Rights Act in 1883, it too assumed that
state common law—and the duty of equal access it encompassed—
would still govern.20 But as Reconstruction ended, legislatures in the
South rejected the duty-to-serve rule in favor of a right, and eventually
duty, of businesses to exclude black people.21 And in many states, courts
came to interpret common law to permit segregation even by core common carriers like trains and inns.22

15

See generally Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1321 (1996) (reviewing American and English treatises, case
law, and custom).
16
Id. at 1327–31.
17
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 515 (1985) (“At the
time the fourteenth amendment was ratified, it still was believed that the common law provided
protection against private interference with individual rights.”).
18
Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 680–81 (1873).
19
Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1, 5 (1875) (“In truth the right of the plaintiff to sue the
defendant for damages would be the same, whether [the act] existed or not . . . .”), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718, 720 (Mich.
1890) (“The common law as it existed in this state before the passage of this statute, and before
the colored man became a citizen under our constitution and laws, gave to the white man a remedy
against any unjust discrimination to the citizen in all public places.”).
20
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883); id. at 25 (“Innkeepers and public carriers, by
the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation[s] to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.”).
21
Singer, supra note 15, at 1388 (noting that by 1900, every state in the former Confederacy
and in Kentucky had statutes requiring segregation).
22
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 89 (2004) (“Common-law challenges to racially unequal railroad
accommodations had frequently succeeded through the mid-1880s, but such cases virtually disappeared thereafter.”).
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Slowly, however, the class of persons entitled to consumer status
expanded. White men had enjoyed access so long as they could pay.
White women were marginal actors, whose status in the consuming
public grew beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and fluctuated
through much of the twentieth.23 Racial minorities had a much more
tenuous grasp on consumer status. Although many Northern states enacted public accommodations statutes prohibiting race and color discrimination after the Civil War, these laws often were honored in the
breach into the early twentieth century.24
To be sure, minority groups were purchasers of goods and services. In some places, they had ample choices.25 Retail stores solicited
the trade of black customers even in the Deep South.26 But service came
with mistreatment and norms that gave priority to white customers. At
other times, disfavored minorities were restricted to a market niche.
For example, before the Civil Rights Era, Mexican, Asian, and Sikh
farm laborers in California might frequent the one market willing to
serve them, while otherwise encountering signs reading “White Trade
Only.”27 Parallel markets sometimes developed as groups launched
their own businesses. In South Texas, Mexicans could shop in “their
own dry goods stores, grocery stores, meat markets, tailor shops and a
number of other shops.”28 Minority groups had access to goods and services, but their status as consumer-citizens entitled to move and spend
freely was denied.29
23

LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 136, 147 (2003) (noting that after WWII, “female consumers withdrew from the
civic arena as wartime citizen consumers and even to some extent as post war purchasers as citizens” as female homemaking became the contrast to male worker-citizen-consumer).
24
Lisa G. Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 238–
40 (1978); see also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 134 (2008) (noting that antidiscrimination laws were frequently ignored in Northern cities and states).
25
Harry T. Quick, Public Accommodations: A Justification of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 660, 708 (1965) (observing that black people “have patronized theaters,
restaurants, amusement parks, and public conveyances, in some locales [in Ohio], to such an extent that their presence is unnoted”); JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 109–
10 (1959) (examination found virtually no discrimination in restaurants in D.C. and New York
City in 1954); Charles Abrams, “. . . Only the Very Best Christian Clientele,” COMMENTARY, Jan. 1,
1955, at 15 (reporting that half of resorts in Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire allowed Jews
as guests).
26
GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 113.
27
NAT’L PARK SERV., CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS 92–93 (2009).
28
DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986 167
(1987).
29
E.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 27, at 116 (noting that throughout the twentieth century, “there was uneven consistency in how and when denials of services” confronted Asian American residents); GRACE E. HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE
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The importance of one’s status as a consumer grew over the twentieth century. As historian Lizabeth Cohen explains, engagement in
commerce served as an increasingly important mark of citizenship as
the United States became a “consumers’ republic.”30 After World War II
in particular, ideals of economic abundance and democratic freedom
aligned to create a civic responsibility of mass consumption.31 As histrion Thomas Sugure observes, “[a]ccess to consumer goods—the right
to buy—was a defining characteristic of what it meant to be an American citizen.”32
The black civil rights movement against segregation in stores and
restaurants claimed black people’s status as consumers. While it would
eventually become viewed as a struggle for integration, “what first
drove blacks who challenged discrimination in public accommodations
after World War II was a demand for equality of access.”33 Some civil
rights leaders explicitly sought to reclaim the antebellum view of the
common law.34 Protestors targeted the theaters, restaurants, and pools
that represented “the promise of American consumer culture.”35 They
asserted “the right to eat and drink, to spend their money, where they
pleased.”36
In this period, black activists and their allies secured the passage,
amendment, and enforcement of city and state laws against public accommodations discrimination.37 And after sustained protests and
bloody attacks, they won the passage of federal public accommodations
law—Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196438—that would end consumer
segregation in the South. As historian Louis Hyman explains, this
movement proved so successful in part due to its inherently conservative claim of a right to spend money.39
SOUTH, 1890–1940 Loc. 3791–3800 (2010) (noting black access in practice to most commercial establishments in 1930s Southern towns with a “constant uncertainty”).
30
See generally COHEN, supra note 23 (analyzing the crucial significance of consumption to
ideals of citizenship, from the Great Depression through the late twentieth century).
31
COHEN, supra note 23, at 127.
32
SUGRUE, supra note 24, at 135.
33
COHEN, supra note 23, at 174.
34
GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 81–87, 96–101.
35
SUGRUE, supra note 24, at 135, 143.
36
Id. at 143.
37
David F. Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice
and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1101–02 (2011) (discussing numerous successful race discrimination suits in Northern and Western states in the
1930s and 1940s); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259–60 (1964) (noting that by the year of the Civil Rights Act’s passage, thirty-two states had public accommodations
laws).
38
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018).
39 Gaby Del Valle, How the Sears Catalog Transformed Shopping Under Jim Crow, VOX (Oct.
19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/19/18001734/sears-catalog-bankruptcy-jim-
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Over the twentieth century, an increasing number of people—
women, people with disabilities, and LGBTQ people—demanded this
right and their status as consumers.40 They too secured legal reform.
Today, nearly all states guarantee “the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
a place of public accommodation” without regard to race, color, national
origin, religion, sex, or disability.41 Many jurisdictions also reach gender
identity and sexual orientation discrimination.42 Reinforced by these
laws, shared norms today dictate that public businesses will serve the
customer at the front of the line first. People anticipate being able to
purchase goods in all shops, not just some shops.
II. DIGNITY AND THE POWER OF THE PUBLIC
Many antidiscrimination laws primarily safeguard access to economically important opportunities. Each individual transaction has
economic weight—the job, apartment, loan, or insurance policy denied.
Individual economic damages can be significant.
The individual injury of public accommodations discrimination,
however, is not primarily economic. As defendants have often argued,
not even “five cents damages” can be said to be inflicted by a restaurant
that serves a black man the same food as his white friends, alone and
in the kitchen.43 Or the movie theater that seats Mexican-Americans on
one side.44 Even where service is denied altogether, the monetary loss
seems trivial. The denial of a cake for a wedding, a lunch at the counter,
or a drink at the bar imposes minimal cost. But as civil rights activist
crow-racism-mail-order [perma.cc/3HX9-F24H]; see also COHEN, supra note 23, at 127 (observing
that one appeal of the Consumer’s Republic was that “it promised the socially progressive end of
economic equality without requiring politically progressive means of redistributing existing
wealth”).
40
Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 107–08 (2019) (describing the feminist movement’s use of this language in the late 1960s and 1970s).
41
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014); State Public Accommodations
Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/SHN6-JMZF].
42
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 41. In many states without such protections, city ordinances typically bar sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination in the
major cities. See Local Nondiscrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http
s://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances [https://perma.cc/C8RK-5ML
V].
43
Crosswaith v. Bergin, 35 P.2d 848, 848–49 (Colo. 1934) (rejecting the argument).
44
Movie theaters in the West and Southwest into the 1940s kept Mexican Americans from
the center seats—an experience Cesar Chavez recalls as launching his fight against discrimination. ALLISON VARZALLY, MAKING A NON-WHITE AMERICA: CALIFORNIANS COLORING OUTSIDE
ETHNIC LINES, 1925–1955 164 (2008); see also Guy v. Tri-State Amuse. Co., 40 Ohio C.C. 77, 80
(Ohio Ct. App. 1917) (rejecting defendant’s argument that black plaintiffs “had just as good an
opportunity to see the pictures or vaudeville performance . . . seated on the right hand side, as if
they were seated in the center section”).
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Ella Baker declared, this sort of discrimination is about “something
much bigger than a hamburger or even a giant-sized Coke.”45
Denial of equal treatment in public accommodations expresses an
ideology of a group’s inferiority, not merely an ordinary civil injury.46
The indignity—or humiliation—is different in kind from mere insult or
hurt feelings. Following Martha Nussbaum, this conception of dignity
is deeply tied to respect.47 When a business denies service or provides
unequal treatment, it expresses disrespect for the would-be patron’s
status as a consumer. As Deborah Hellman convincingly argues, wrongful discrimination, unlike differentiation, demeans its targets. It requires both expression—that the person is less worthy of equal respect—and power or status—that the person expressing disrespect is in
a position to subordinate the other.48 In this regard, the publicness of
the refusal further distinguishes public accommodations. Although
some discrimination takes place one-on-one, the presence of an audience of strangers sets public accommodations apart from employment
or housing. Before an audience of fellow citizens, the proprietor has the
power to impugn the standing of a person to participate in public commerce.
Courts have long conceptualized the denial of equal access as a dignitary harm. In the late nineteenth century, courts recognized that
granting a remedy for indignity inflicted by public accommodations was
essential, because otherwise the plaintiff would receive mere contract
damages—the cost of the ticket, for example—which would not adequately reflect the harm.49 One court summarized its state’s common
law, “[e]very person . . . has a right to go to any public place, or visit a
resort where the public generally are invited” with “freedom from insult, personal indignities, or acts which subject him to humiliation and
disgrace . . . .”50 In carrying on business with the public generally, a

45

Ella Baker, Bigger Than a Hamburger, SOUTHERN PATRIOT (May 1960), http://www.crmve
t.org/docs/sncc2.htm [perma.cc/B8E3-6N3R].
46
Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1591, 1620 (2001).
47
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 31
(2011).
48
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG 35 (2008).
49
Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185, 190 (1870) (holding that where a common carrier
inflicts delay, vexation, and indignity by excluding a passenger, the actual pecuniary damages
sustained “would, most often, be no compensation at all”); see also Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 61
S.W. 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (“That damages for mental pain, anxiety, distress, or humiliation suffered . . . may be recovered, though unaccompanied with physical injury, pain, or suffering, is now too well settled in this state to admit of question.”).
50
Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 207 (1904) (where amusement park employee insulted a white plaintiff’s character by mistaking her for another woman).
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proprietor assumed a duty to treat them with respect for their status as
a paying customer.
Public accommodations statutes imported this commitment to consumer dignity. Leading the National Organization for Women’s campaign to prohibit sex discrimination by the many male-only public
places of the late 1960s, Karen DeCrow wrote, “the most basic right of
all may be the right to equal treatment in places of public accommodation. It means the right to human dignity, the right to be free from humiliation and insult, and the right to refuse to wear a badge of inferiority at any time or place.”51 In upholding Title II in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, the Supreme Court emphasized that its “fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access.’”52 Other courts describe “the injury to an individual’s sense of self-worth and personal integrity.”53
While incivility and disappointment are common in our society,
public accommodations have particular power to inflict humiliation for
three reasons. First, as common law often recognizes, commercial
sellers have the upper hand in their relationships with customers.54
Their social role dictates that businesses take greater precautions than
average individuals must.55 Free speech doctrine also approaches consumer-business relations with some awareness of power dynamics.56
Second, the practice of holding open an invitation to the public increases the likelihood of people encountering indignity unaware. As the
Supreme Court has noted, public accommodations laws structure “an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.”57 The pervasive nature of public
accommodations means consumers are vulnerable to discrimination in
a way that is unrelenting. Whereas individuals apply to and interact
with relatively few potential employers or even landlords, they routinely—even daily—enter businesses open the public. In the absence of

51

Sepper & Dinner, supra note 40, at 111.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
53
King v. Greyhound Lines, 656 P.2d 349, 352 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
54 Some courts have ascribed the duty to avoid indignity and insult to the special relationship
between a public accommodation and its customers. See Meyer v. Hot Bagels Factory, 721 N.E.2d
1068, 1076–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (noting that in Ohio, this reasoning was recognized as early
as 1911).
55
Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Too
Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2009) (explaining why, based on social
roles, commercial actors must take greater precautions to protect others than “ordinary folks”).
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See, e.g., Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441,
468 (2019) (discussing how free speech doctrine acknowledges disparities in knowledge and sophistication between sellers and consumers—what she calls “expressive inequality”—to permit
greater regulation of the offers and exchanges in which they are engaged).
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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equal access, members of marginalized groups face constant uncertainty about where, when, and how they will access goods and services.
People can avoid associating with their enemies, but often will find
themselves “invited to an establishment, only to find its doors barred to
them.”58
Third, in public accommodations, the presence of an audience enhances the impact of the business’s denial of service. Surveying cases
involving offenses to dignity, in 1938, Fowler Harper and Mary
McNeely concluded that these denials involved almost uniformly incidents that occurred in public, including accusations of theft and ordering of patrons out of amusement parks, theaters, and trains—in front
of an audience of other patrons.59 Adjudicating claims brought under
both the common law and public accommodations statutes, courts often
highlighted the size of the crowd of witnesses.60 The New York Court of
Appeals, for example, said, “it is the publicity of the thing that causes
the humiliation.”61
African American legal scholar Patricia Williams recounted her
own experience in a law review article.62 While Christmas shopping in
New York City, Williams rang a store buzzer, eager to enter the store
and purchase a sweater in the window for her mother. The salesclerk
glared and then mouthed “we’re closed.” Williams was not fooled, “It
was one o’clock in the afternoon. There were several white people in the
store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers.” Moved
nearly to violence, she recalls, “I am still struck by the structure of
power that drove me into such a blizzard of rage. There was almost
nothing I could do . . . that would humiliate him the way he humiliated
me.”63 She recognized the clerk’s power to disrespect her status as a
consumer. He would not acknowledge her, Williams says, “even at the
estranged level of arm’s length transactor.”64
Public accommodations discrimination requires its victims not
merely to listen but to perform. Most obviously, the Jim Crow system of
58

Evans v. Ross, 154 A.2d 441, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liability for
Emotional Distress, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 426 (1983).
60
See, e.g., Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S.W. 195, 197 (Ky. 1909) (noting that theater employees showed “a disposition to oppress and disgrace” a customer made worse by the “presence of
a number of persons”); Odom v. E. Ave. Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1942) (observing “the presence
of a number of people”), aff’d, 264 A.D. 985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942); Kelly v. Dent Theaters, Inc., 21
S.W.2d 592, 592–93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (noting that when an orderly theatergoer was ejected a
crowd “filled the whole sidewalk in front of the building” to watch).
61
Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.E. 736, 738 (N.Y. 1911).
62
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 128 (1987).
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Id. at 128.
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the South required compliance with a complex set of manners and customs in commercial space.65 Historian Grace Elizabeth Hale vividly describes one such performance: “[c]limbing above the ‘for white men’ only
restroom between the segregation sign and the Dr. Pepper advertisement, the black man can watch the same movie and drink the same
soda as a white patron as long as he declares his race and, by implication as well as the shabby surroundings, his inferiority as he enjoys his
purchases.”66 The audience understood what Bruce Ackerman calls the
“systematic degradation ritual”67 by virtue of the two speakers involved—the proprietor and the would-be patron. Public commercial
spaces functioned as a “theater” for the contradictions of segregation.68
While the minority group invariably is called upon to perform, the
conduct or speech compelled varies by time, space, and trait. As a black
woman, prominent educator Mary Church Terrell describes being unable to eat in Washington, D.C., “from the Capitol to the White House”
unless she “were willing to sit behind a screen.”69 At professional meetings in the 1960s, women of any race would need to peel off from their
colleagues or subordinates to go to ladies’ entrances and elevators. Gays
and lesbians performed the role of heterosexual and took care to wear a
minimum number of articles of “gender appropriate” clothing so as to
avoid scrutiny.
Unequal treatment by a business sends a message that the patron
or would-be patron is not worthy of respect. At mid-century, Jewish
groups worked to bar discriminatory signs, recognizing that “such
words as ‘selected clientele’ connote in the public mind that colored persons, Jews and others who are not lily-white need not apply.”70 Two decades later, encounters with the many bars that banned unescorted
women and the restaurants that excluded all women during businessmen’s lunch hours prompted “the realization that society thought—as
one woman said—that ‘women don’t belong in the outside world.’”71 In
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This civility demand on the racial minority persisted even as the laws of Jim Crow were
taken down. See generally Joseph Crespino, Civilities and Civil Rights in Mississippi, in MANNERS
AND SOUTHERN HISTORY 114 (Ted Ownby, ed. 2007) (demonstrating the way white elite weaponized civility against black civil rights movement).
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HALE, supra note 29, at Loc. 3861.
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BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 138 (2014).
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ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS
55–75 (1994).
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PAULA C. AUSTIN, COMING OF AGE IN JIM CROW DC Loc. 830 (2019).
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Camp-Of-The-Pines, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1945). For more
detailed history across the United States, see John Higham, Social Discrimination Against Jews
in America, 1830–1930, 47 PUBS. AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y 1 (1957).
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Georgina Hickey, Barred from the Barroom: Second Wave Feminists and Public Accommodations in U.S. Cities, 34 FEMINIST STUD. 382, 389 (2008). For a full exploration of feminist advocacy during the late 1960s and 1970s, see Sepper & Dinner, supra note 40, at 80–81.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court likewise recognized that public accommodations discrimination treated gay couples “as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity
and worth.”72 Disfavored groups not only saw their standing fall in a
single business but also experienced “community-wide stigma.”73
Mistreatment by public accommodations—unlike an average social
interaction—is able to systematically change a person’s standing among
their fellows.74 Charlie Parker, an African American man born in the
1890s in Mississippi, remembered that at banks and post offices when
a white person came in, black people “would always get back and let
him go first, you come last.”75 These practices let black people know
their place in society and the market.76 It was not only black people in
the Jim Crow South who received this message. In the 1960s, public
accommodations discrimination affirmed the marginal nature of LGBT
people’s access to the public. Proprietors forced gay men to sit alone
with their back to other customers to eat a meal or to face the bar rather
than socialize with one another.77 That same decade, women too were
sometimes literally put in their place. At the National Press Club
awards dinner, for example, female journalists were seated with the
wives in a separate room.78 While the type of unequal treatment of each
of these groups differed in meaningful ways from each other, public accommodations discrimination designated their proper (and limited)
place both literally and figuratively.
Public accommodations thus have an inescapable power to demean
would-be customers. The public marketplace contains retail, service,
and amusement; it meets needs and wants for commerce and leisure.
Where norms of equal access and first-come, first-served are not universally observed, marginalized people live with constant potential for
discrimination. They risk conscription into a performance that signals
their inferior standing and limited claim to consumption before an audience of their fellow citizens.
72

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
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Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2204–05 (1990) (noting
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As the next two Parts explain, the market and dignitary functions
of public accommodations laws help explain why doctrine has largely
carved out these commercial spaces from the reach of free speech. Conventions of equal-access structure expectations such that service does
not communicate a message to consumers and the broader public.
III. FREE SPEECH AND THE CONVENTIONS OF THE CONSUMER MARKET
First Amendment theorists have often puzzled over the boundaries
of First Amendment coverage. Speech in schools and public employment, for example, often lies outside the scope of free speech. In commercial settings, laws may target what otherwise might be thought to
be covered speech, such as laws requiring disclosure and setting parameters for dealing. Dignitary torts allow plaintiffs to seek damages
against speakers.79
Courts also have understood public businesses to play a distinct
social role, requiring regulation that is largely shielded from First
Amendment scrutiny. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, for example, Justice
Kennedy distinguished public accommodations from realms of freedom
of free exercise and expression. He observed that a clergy member
would clearly be protected from performing a marriage for a couple, and
religious organizations and individuals should be free to hold and “teach
the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and
faiths.”80 But the “general rule” was clear: “objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”81 As the Supreme
Court held long ago, in this marketplace “open to the public to come and
go as they please,” the state enjoys broad authority to create rights of
public access on behalf of its citizens.82
While this article makes no pretense to theorize the First Amendment’s scope, it helps clarify why it is that public accommodations laws
in particular have long enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with the First
Amendment. Consistent with sociological accounts of First Amendment
coverage, it argues that public accommodations operate according to
79

Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 347, 349 (Catherine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2000) (noting the absence
of “moderately workable and well-known doctrinal or theoretical standards to determine the scope
of the First Amendment’s coverage”).
80
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018)
(quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679 – 80 (2015)) (noting that this exercise of religion
“gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and
worth”).
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fixed social conventions that require service and a modicum of respect
from the business toward the consumer. As Amanda Shanor argues, the
First Amendment tends not to reach where social norms are cohesive,
rather than pluralist, and speech acts are “straightforward in their effect” on the audience.83 These criteria are particularly likely to exist
within commerce. As Daniel Halberstam explains, whereas public debate allows for the construction and challenging of background norms
and suffers no bounds, a commercial transaction “does not leave much
room for cultural differences or diverging beliefs about the nature of the
transacted deal.”84 Engaged in bargaining, the “speakers” seek an
agreement, “ultimately objectified in a material transaction[;]” they do
not explore each other’s beliefs.85 Constitutional and common law take
buyer and seller to share a commitment to the rules governing commercial transactions.86
When consumers and proprietors meet in public accommodations—
a subset of the commercial world—they too assume a single set of background norms and values. In this “predefined communicative project,”87
the public accommodation invites all the world to transact business. Because its purpose is to serve the public, equal access is intrinsic to the
business. The baseline is that a business will serve “any member of the
public who is willing to pay.”88 And, as Parts I and II explained, an expectation of service and respectful treatment attaches.
This taken-for-grantedness of the governing norms is central to the
consumer market. Establishing discrimination is relatively straightforward as a result. Unlike in employment, proof that, for example, a black
patron was turned away and a white patron was seated would suffice.89
In Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court echoed this understanding
of rights of equal access, describing them as “taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need them.”90
Indeed, these norms are so uniform among the in-group that when a
restaurant or store refuses to sell, consumers demand answers.
Public accommodations may be a space where the First Amendment’s hands-off approaches to commercial transactions and to common
law torts, respectively, align. As Shanor explains, “the exclusion of
83
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Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status
of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 833 (1999).
85
Id. at 833–34.
86
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common-law torts safeguards a space of cohesive social norms around
what it means to treat others with dignity and respect.”91 For example,
Robert Post argues that the tort of invasion of privacy, which has remained largely immune from the First Amendment’s reach, does not
have purely individualist goals. The tort instead “safeguards rules of
civility that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and
community.”92 In other words, it redresses individual injury to personality and upholds the norms that generate the community. Common law
torts built around equal access and dignified treatment share these
functions, constructing a public space of consumption. Originating in
these dignitary torts, public accommodations laws promote both individual remedy and market-wide structures.93
Unlike plural political debates, public accommodations manifest an
orthodoxy of identity-neutral capitalism. Antidiscrimination laws in
this area foster low-information exchanges: as a general rule, consumers do not have to provide qualifications to gain access to products. Nor
do businesses need to know much about a consumer. Proprietor and patron interact as strangers. The consumer market functions in a race-,
sex-, sexual orientation-, and other identity-trait neutral way.94 Ability
to pay becomes the sole concern of the transaction.95 Dollars are exchanged seamlessly, anonymously, and without need for introducing
search or information costs.
The dictates of service and dignity construct a uniform market of
full—not just equal—enjoyment. As Hubert Humphrey described Title
II, equality in public accommodations meant any customer could go to
“the nearest soda fountain,” “the nearest restaurant” and take “his pick
of the available motels and hotels.”96 More recently, dissenting from the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Telescope Media v. Lucero, Judge Kelly explained: these laws do not aim to ensure “access to some places of public
accommodation. They were passed to guarantee equal access to all
goods and services otherwise available to the public.”97 Consumers anticipate freely moving and purchasing in all businesses open to the public. There is no room for pluralism as to these ground rules.
91

Shanor, supra note 83, at 349.
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IV. THE SILENCE OF SERVICE AND THE EXPRESSION OF DENIAL
The unique nature of public accommodations law also adds to our
understanding of the “major contest” in the wedding vendor cases—
namely, whether the conduct of preparing a wedding service actually
communicates anything to the public at large.98 Until 2019, court after
court concluded that public accommodations law regulated wedding
vendors’ conduct—the baking and sale of a cake, for example. That conduct was not “inherently expressive” so as to be entitled to full First
Amendment protections.99 Regardless of whether the wedding vendors
intended to convey a message through their conduct, viewers were unlikely to understand providing a good or service in commerce to express
the vendor’s message about marriage.100 Courts worried that any other
decision would license “a public accommodation that serves only opposite-sex couples” or other in-groups, and would generate intractable
line-drawing problems. 101
But in 2019, in Telescope Media, the Eighth Circuit determined
that commercial videography of opposite-sex weddings constitutes expressive conduct conveying the business’s own views that marriage is
“a divinely ordained covenant” between a man and a woman.102 Requiring service for a same-sex couple—the court said—would instead compel the owners to speak favorably about same-sex marriage.103 The First
Amendment thus barred the application of public accommodation law.
The Arizona Supreme Court soon followed, granting a stationary company protection under the Arizona Constitution.104 Justices Thomas
98
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and Gorsuch have already expressed their opinion that the sale of custom wedding cakes is expressive conduct that antidiscrimination law
cannot reach.105 The Supreme Court is likely to take up the issue in the
near future.106
In this kind of litigation, courts have typically presumed a symmetry between the ability of service and denial to communicate. The
Supreme Court of Washington, for example, noted that even the objecting florist admitted that service often did not communicate her endorsement of a wedding.107 She did not understand herself to endorse atheism
or Islam by arranging flowers for an atheist or Muslim wedding. Likewise, the court said, refusal could occur for various reasons—ranging
from religious objection to insufficient stock.108 To the court, service and
denial were equally non-communicative.
The long-standing conventions governing public commerce, however, indicate an asymmetry in the expressiveness of service and denial.
A public business fails to express any message, let alone a particularized one, through mere service, because we expect paying customers to
be served. The audience of other patrons discerns no communication
from a business pouring a coffee, selling a cake, or cutting a person’s
hair. We take for granted that the first person in line will be served,
and the wedding vendor will provide its usual goods if available.
The provision of service requires no reason giving. When a server
brings a meal to a table, they don’t explain that it’s because “you seem
like a nice Christian family.” When a photographer agrees to document
a wedding ceremony, they don’t tell you that they support your wedding
or opposite-sex weddings more generally. You understand that the price
is right and the date is available.
The fact that a business sells an item to someone does not imply its
endorsement. To be sure, serving a particular person might feel expressive of endorsement to the vendor—the baker, florist, etc. But to the
majority in-group, service doesn’t communicate approval of the customer, of their use of the product, or much of anything else. With fleeting interactions, customers and businesses typically experience little
intimacy and acquire little knowledge about one another.109 Even with
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wedding vendors hired for a special day in the lives of the celebrants,
the duration of the relationship is quite limited in time, space, and
depth. The offer to perform is made without exclusiveness, to one and
all. Under these circumstances, the proprietor and customers are not
associated with one another or united by any particular views.110
Whether or not the goods are artistic—a tattoo or handwritten invites—
the public’s expectations and perceptions remain the same.111
To the extent service expresses anything, it might send the message that the customer is entitled to be treated like any other customer—as Sam Bagenstos has pointed out.112 As he notes, if this is
right, then whenever a retail business provides a good, regardless of
what is sold, it engages in expression. While Bagenstos sees this message as forceful, it seems muted in contemporary consumer marketplaces. When the social norm was to subjugate a minority group, a business that seated people side by side would indeed powerfully
communicate a message of social equality both to the marginalized
group and to the audience of consumers. After the enactment of civil
rights protections, however, this same act might have expressed mere
legal compliance. And with the passage of time and the shift in consumer expectations, service has come to reflect the background norm of
treating consumers with dignity and respect. It signifies, as I have suggested, the intrinsic nature of a business organized around serving the
public—namely, that all paying customers are served. With decades of
experience of the Civil Rights Era settlement, to the extent that service
communicates a message of equality, it does so in a whisper.
Denial, by contrast, communicates loudly to both the would-be consumer and a larger audience. Denied flowers for his wedding to Robert
Ingersoll, Curt Freed understood the message that “our business is no
longer good business.”113 Rejected by a bed and breakfast on their vacation, unmarried same-sex couple Diane Cervelli and Taeko Bufford
heard that they were “inferior and unworthy of equal treatment in even
a routine business transaction.”114 When a business open to the public
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turns a person away, it powerfully expresses—as these couples understood—that the person does not merit status as a consumer.
Nor does denial invite multiple interpretations as service does.
While service requires no justification, denial calls for explanation. Because a refusal to serve or seat a patron is unexpected in light of social
norms governing public businesses, it often prompts the would-be patron to demand a reason. The vendor must explain that stock is depleted, a table reserved, or the shop closed.115 In the absence of a reason
that applies to all consumers, the message and meaning of denial is
one’s inferiority in the consumer marketplace.116
Of course, the free speech claims in current litigation could be
equally framed as either a denial or a provision of service. A wedding
vendor could be said to engage in expressive conduct (or speech)
through withholding a cake or invitations—sending a message that the
would-be patron’s wedding is lesser. But objectors to same-sex marriage
have explicitly framed their expression in terms of service to customers
who they prefer not to serve. They argue that nondiscrimination requires them to speak in favor of same-sex marriage. On this construction, it is service to the couple—whether preparing a cake or arranging
flowers—that communicates approval or endorsement.
The asymmetry between the messages of service and denial help
explain this choice. While service might communicate quietly or not at
all, denial as expression sends a clear message of gay inferiority. The
desire to express that message would make these business owners lessthan-sympathetic standard-bearers for the movement for exemptions
from public accommodations laws.
Courts moreover might be more concerned about where exemptions
framed to authorize denials of service would lead. Objectors paint their
requested free speech exemption as “narrow,” applying only to the production of expressive or artistic services.117 But denial of goods and services—not just expressive goods—powerfully communicates in a way
Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919, 935 (Haw. Ct. App. 2018) (No. 11-1-3103-12), 2011 WL 10604318.
115
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that the provision of even expressive goods does not. Under the conventions that govern the consumer market today, denial speaks louder
than service.
CONCLUSION
The line between speech and conduct may not always be clear. But
states have long required nondiscriminatory service by public accommodations. Such obligations have co-existed peacefully with West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette’s invocation that “no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.”118 The application of public accommodations
laws to commercial sales of even expressive goods and services has not,
pace the Arizona Supreme Court, “compel[led] uniformity of beliefs and
ideas.”119 Indeed, public accommodations laws expressly leave the social, private, and political free of restraint. Business owners retain their
“individual freedom of mind” and the component rights to speak and
refrain from speaking.120 Only in the licensed, regulated, and surveilled
commercial marketplace will duties of equal access apply.
Nor is public accommodation law aimed—as Justice Thomas
opined—“to produce a society free of . . . biases” against the protected
groups.121 Its overarching goal is to secure a consumer market of freely
moving people and currency. Given power imbalances between business
and individual consumers, it requires public-facing businesses to show
a modicum of civility and respect for dignity of would-be patrons.
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that Barnette applies to commercial cake baking “is to reconfigure what has been considered a
purely commercial realm subject to civil rights laws into a hodge-podge where some commercial
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120
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637); see also
Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on
Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 750 (2003) (“[T]ransactional speech and
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The expansionist project of free speech doctrine has public accommodations laws within its sights. If businesses prevail in their constitutional claims, a number of serious questions arise: What kind of a
consumer market will we be left with? In the absence of a shared expectation of service, will we see contestation over norms of the consumer
market as we did decades ago? Or will the market become balkanized
with stores organized around specific religious or other values rather
than abstract customers and their dollars? Will gay identity and relationships be sent back into the closet to be able to access consumer
goods? And will other civil rights protections in employment, housing,
and education remain unscathed? Is public accommodations discrimination sufficiently distinct in its focus on dignity and its impact on
realms of shallow, transient, arms-length relations? Are its “evils” so
“unique” that we might distinguish the rest of civil rights law?
What seems clear is that a constitutional privilege against public
accommodations law would destabilize longstanding conventions of service and civility in the consumer marketplace. Exceptions—however the
lines are drawn—would undermine an identity-neutral marketplace
where dollars and people flow freely without the friction of information
and search costs. They quite literally would reduce the space for individual dignity.

